![]() ![]() Most importantly, I didn’t clearly explain that there’s an enormous continuum between, on the one hand, a full break of RSA or Diffie-Hellman (which still seems extremely unlikely to me), and on the other, “pure side-channel attacks” involving no new cryptanalytic ideas. The answer to Charles Seife’s question above … is left as an exercise for the reader. Party A is simply looking for specific market liquidity prior to the termination date of the contract. Even if the muppets are rational they get arbed by party A on the spread. The gambler (the risk taker, party A) then monetizes on the spread between party A’s certainty and the uncertainty surrounding undisclosed theorem among the retail market investors to breakeven or profit on the fee or bribe to produce a positive ROI (return on investment to Party A). In exchange for a fee or bribe, the player or players agree to ensure that their team will not “disclose the proof of the given theorem” before a prenegotiated contract termination date (end of the game). I’m gonna go ahead and call first on the term-of-art “ Theorem Shaving.” A theorem shaving scheme generally involves a sovereign agency, corporate, or administration (party A, the gambler) and one or more players of the team known to be exclusively/uniquely able or expected to prove a theorem (party B scores the points). ![]() Michael Kelley, BI, The FBI Investigated Knicks Players in the ’80s for Allegedly Fixing Games for a Drug Dealer, here.
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